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Abstract
This article looks back at Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] twenty years on. It
examines the ways in which the legal arguments of
unconstitutional constitutional amendment were
constructed by the counsels of the appellants and
how the Justices ruled accordingly. The main text
of the Constitution said nothing about the exercise
of constitutional amending power, meaning that it
was being misused by the National Assembly—
posing a challenge to Taiwan’s political taboo on
the extension of terms of office. The disputed
constitutional amendments were therefore struck
down by the Justices as the guardians of the
constitution, thereby founding the principle of
limited constitutional amending power in Taiwan.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] represents a
milestone in the legal history of Taiwan. It proclaimed the Fifth
Amendment of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the
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Republic of China1 as the unconstitutional constitutional amendment2
preventing the exercise of the constitutional amending power from
“[bringing] down the constitutional normative order in its entirety”3
when the main text of the Constitution4 was silent. The Interpretation
was filed by Hau Lung-Pin and Cheng Pao-Ching on October 28,
1999, and by Hung Chao-Nan on November 18, 1999.5 The Justices
heard the case on November 26, 1999, 6 and expeditiously
promulgated their decision on March 24, 2000.7
Unlike the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz),8 there was (and
is) “[n]o eternity clause in the Constitution”9 of the Republic of China
(Taiwan).
Consequently, the legal limitations of Taiwan’s
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1
MINGUO XIANFA amend. (民國憲法增修條文) [Additional Articles of the
Constitution of the Republic of China] (1999) (Taiwan).
2
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
499] (2000) [hereinafter Shizi No. 499 Jieshi].
3
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
499] (2000) (Official translation) [hereinafter Shizi No. 499 Jieshi Official
Translation].
4
MINGUO XIANFA (民國憲法) [Constitution of the Republic of China] (Adopted
on Dec. 25, 1946, by the Constituent National Assembly convened in Nanking;
promulgated by the Nationalist Government on Jan. 1, 1947; entered into force on
Dec. 25, 1947) (Taiwan).
5
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI YIJIANSHU CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN (釋字第 499 號解釋
意見書抄本等文件) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 Appendix] (2000)
[hereinafter Judicial Yuan Interpretation].
6
JUDICIAL YUAN, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, R.O.C.,
http://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/zh-tw/categories/milestonelist/y21lmta1
[https://perma.cc/9JQT-CD6P] (last visited Aug. 16, 2020).
7
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2.
8
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], § 79 ¶3, translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/PBP4-5G3S] (1949).
9
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at ¶ 9.
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constitutional amending power remained open to argument. 10
However, the Justices ruled in accordance with the German theory of
limited constitutional amending power 11 originated by Carl
Schmitt,12 holding that some constitutional provisions “are [not] open
to change through constitutional amendment,” 13 because such
provisions—despite not being explicitly stated—“are integral to the
essential nature of the Constitution and underpin the constitutional
normative order.” 14
Any constitutional amendment which
contradicts these provisions is therefore considered an
unconstitutional constitutional amendment.15
Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment of the Additional Articles
of the Constitution of the Republic of China 16 was considered
unconstitutional for three main reasons: that it violated the principles
of popular sovereignty, 17 due process, 18 and the nemo dat rule. 19
However, what really angered Taiwanese citizens20 was the extension
of the terms of office of the members of the National Assembly by
two years and forty-two days,21 and of the members of the Legislative
Yuan by five months.22 The Chinese political tradition of lifelong
10

See, e.g., JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Tseng, H.,
dissenting).
11
See generally AOIFE O’DONOGHUE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISATION 54–86 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014).
12
CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY] 75–87
(Duncker & Humblot 1928); see also ULRICH K. PREUß, CARL SCHMITT AND THE
WEIMAR CONSTITUTION, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CARL SCHMITT 477–479
(Jens Meierhenrich & Oliver Simons eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2016).
13
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
MINGUO XIANFA amend. (民國憲法增修條文) [Additional Articles of the
Constitution of the Republic of China] (1999) (Taiwan).
17
See generally DANIEL LESSARD LEVIN, REPRESENTING POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY:
THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 1–194 (State Univ. New
York Press, 1999).
18
See generally DENNIS D. RILEY & BRYAN E. BROPHY-BAERMANN,
BUREAUCRACY AND THE POLICY PROCESS: KEEPING THE PROMISES 298 (Rowman
& Littlefield 2006) (indicating that “[b]y definition, due process is a matter of
procedure”).
19
See generally ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 790 (Cavendish
Publishing, 4th ed. 2005).
20
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
21
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
22
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4 (1999) (Taiwan).
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tenure23 was already a political taboo in Taiwan, and it had been since
the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], which
stated that no one could extend any term of office for any reason from
this point onwards, unless the country was once again put into a state
of emergency.24
II.

HISTORICAL INSIGHTS

The Fifth Amendment of the Additional Articles of the
Constitution of the Republic of China was revised by the National
Assembly on September 3, 1999 and promulgated by the President
on September 15, 1999.25 However, this Amendment was a surprise
to Taiwanese citizens, because it comprised an extension of the terms
of office of members of the National Assembly by two years and
forty-two days, 26 and of members of the Legislative Yuan by five
months.27 Furthermore, it transformed the role of members of the
National Assembly from representatives of the people 28 to
representatives of political parties, 29 apportioning the seats of
members of the new National Assembly only in accordance with the
“votes that the candidates nominated by each political party and all
the independent candidates receive in the parallel election for the
Members of the Legislative Yuan.” 30 In other words, the Fifth
Amendment came as a political, legal and constitutional shock to the
Republic of China (Taiwan) as a young democracy at the time. Nigel
N.T. Li, who was one of the participants in this historical event
23

MEIRU LIU, INTELLECTUAL DISSIDENTS IN CHINA 58 (Edwin Mellen Press
2001) (indicating that the Chinese “traditional rule [was] lifetime tenure for the
ruler”).
24
Compare SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI (釋字第 31 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No. 31] (1954), with SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第 261 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 261] (1990), and SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋)
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000).
25
MINGUO XIANFA amend. (民國憲法增修條文) [Additional Articles of the
Constitution of the Republic of China] (1999) (Taiwan).
26
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
27
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4 (1999) (Taiwan).
28
Compare MINGUO XIANFA §§ 25–34 (1947) (Taiwan), with MINGUO XIANFA
amend. § 1 (1997) (Taiwan).
29
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
30
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, ¶ 10; see also
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
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concluded in his constitutional law textbook that the Amendment
provided an opportunity to consider the merits of democratism and
constitutionalism 31 through the event and its subsequent judicial
review,32 i.e., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000]. Li stated
that:
This review determined the limits of constitutional
amending power whilst enlightening us to ponder two
fundamental questions regarding democratism and
constitutionalism: How to prevent the majority from
becoming tyrannical in the name of democracy, [i.e.
the tyranny of the majority], and how to deter
representatives from betraying the electorate. 33 —
Nigel N.T. Li (2007)
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] answered both
questions. In terms of democratism, the Interpretation declared that
“[s]ome constitutional provisions are integral to the essential nature
of the Constitution and underpin the constitutional normative order.
If such provisions are open to change through constitutional
amendment, adoption of such constitutional amendments would
bring down the constitutional normative order in its entirety.”34 And
in terms of constitutionalism, it declared that “the legitimacy of
representative democracy lies in the adherence of elected political
representatives to their social contract with the electorate. Its cardinal
principle is that the new election must take place at the end of the
fixed electoral term.”35 In other words, the Justices in Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] were warning the National Assembly
of the limits of democracy, stating that “a democratic decision . . .
31

Nigel N.T. Li’s original phrasing is “democratism and republicanism.”
However, Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung, as a mentor of Li, referred to the same concept
using the phrase “democratism and constitutionalism” in his concurring opinion.
In order to avoid misconstruction, the phrase “democratism and
constitutionalism” is therefore chosen.
32
See generally NIGEL N.T. LI, AN LI XIAN FA I: XIAN FA YUAN LI YU JI BEN
REN QUAN GAI LUN [CONSTITUTIONAL CASE STUDIES I: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS] 91–100 (San Min Books 2007).
33
Id. at 97 (Authors’ translation).
34
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3.
35
Id.
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cannot derogate or even destroy democratism per se.”36 “This is what
is called the problem of tyranny of the majority,” 37 under which
democratic decisions are “so unjust that they undermine the
legitimacy of democracy.”38 However, the Justices also reaffirmed
the importance of democracy for the performance of
constitutionalism, stating that “constitutionalism is only a piece of
decoration . . . unless and until it embraces democracy.”39 This is the
problem of constitutionalism, under which representative democracy
is a necessity, but “[m]en of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or
of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means,
first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the
people.” 40 Essentially, this means that some decisions cannot be
made by majority vote, 41 and constitutional safeguards against the
representatives’ betrayal are indispensable too.42
Perhaps Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] shows
how impractical it is of a young democracy attempts to constrain its
legislative or constitutional amending power only through political
means.43 “Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it
chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human
rights . . . . The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are
ultimately political, not legal.”44 Even if we consider that political
constraint works perfectly in the United Kingdom, it is totally

36

JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
THOMAS CHRISTIANO, INTRODUCTION, IN PHILOSOPHY AND DEMOCRACY: AN
ANTHOLOGY 10 (Thomas Christiano ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
38
Id.
39
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
40
JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST: NO.10, in THE FEDERALIST 47 (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001) (1788).
41
See generally THOMAS CHRISTIANO, INTRODUCTION, in PHILOSOPHY AND
DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 10–12 (Thomas Christiano ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2003).
42
See generally JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST: NO.10, in THE FEDERALIST
47 (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Fund 2001) (1788).
43
Compare ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF
THE CONSTITUTION 3–4 (8th ed., Macmillan 1915), with R v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(Lord Hoffmann elaborating the constraints upon legislative power shall be
“political, not legal”).
44
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115
(appeal taken from Eng.)
37
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impractical in Taiwan. Instead, Carl Schmitt’s theory45 of limited
constitutional amending power46 is indispensable. And this was the
lesson the citizens of Taiwan learned from Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499 [2000]—no politics should lie beyond the
reach of judicial review, i.e., the judicialisation of politics47 or megapolitics.48
When looking back on Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499
[2000] in its twentieth anniversary year, it is no exaggeration to say
that the hard work of at least three generations brought an end to the
Chinese political tradition of lifelong tenure.49 The Interpretation set
a milestone marking Taiwan’s progress towards democratisation and
constitutionalisation, because no politician in this country dare to
extend his or her term of office from that point onward. In all truth,
it was unlikely that Taiwanese citizens fully understood the theory of
limited constitutional amending power,50 or the principles of popular
sovereignty51 and due process.52 However, it is a matter of record
that citizens were angered by the National Assembly’s decision to
self-extend of the term of office,53 albeit with limited knowledge of
the nemo dat rule.54 If the members of the National Assembly could
extend their term of office again,55 it would be no different from the
restoration of Chinese political tradition.
Forty-six years before Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499
[2000], first generation Justices ruled that “our state has been
undergoing a severe calamity, which makes re-election of the second

45

SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 75–87; see also PREUß, supra note 12, at 477–479.
See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86.
47
RAN HIRSCHL, THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 253–274 (Robert E. Goodin ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2011).
48
Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political
Courts, 11 ANNU. REV. POLITICAL SCI. 93, 93–118 (2008).
49
LIU, supra note 23, at 58 (indicating that the Chinese “traditional rule [was]
lifetime tenure for the ruler”).
50
See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86.
51
See generally LEVIN, supra note 17, at 1–194.
52
See RILEY & BROPHY-BAERMANN, supra note 18, at 298 (indicating that “[b]y
definition, due process is a matter of procedure”).
53
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
54
See generally HUDSON, supra note 19, at 790.
55
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
46

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

428

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 15

term of both Yuans de facto impossible.”56 Hence, all of the firstterm members of Congress “shall continue to exercise their respective
powers” 57 before new members of both chambers “are elected,
convene and are convoked in accordance with the laws.” 58 This
decision was made in 1954, during the Cold War.59 It was at this time
that the Government of the Republic of China “continued to declare
its intention to retake mainland China” 60 after state secession in
1949, 61 asserting its constitutional legitimacy to represent all of
China. 62 Against such a background, the Justices “came to this
decision pragmatically: compared to having no legislators
representing the entire China, it would be wiser to retain the old
one.”63 However, “the decision offered further hints at the National
Assembly’s desire for legislative power expansion,” 64 granting de
facto lifelong tenure to members of Congress before national
reunification.65
Twenty-three years before Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
499 [2000], members of the National Assembly with de facto lifelong
tenure attempted to transform the de facto lifelong tenure granted by
the Justices in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] into the de
jure lifelong tenure according to the Temporary Provisions of the
Constitution. 66 This is laid out in Judicial Yuan Interpretation
56

SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI (釋字第 31 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 31]
(1954) (Official translation).
57
Id. (Official translation).
58
Id. (Official translation).
59
See generally DENNY ROY, TAIWAN: A POLITICAL HISTORY 105–151 (Cornell
Univ. Press, 2003).
60
LARS SCHERNIKAU, ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COAL TRADE: WHY
COAL CONTINUES TO POWER THE WORLD 191 (Springer, 2nd ed. 2016).
61
See generally MICHAEL DILLON, CHINA: A MODERN HISTORY 228–255 (I.B.
Tauris 2012).
62
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
1451 (David S. Clark ed., SAGE Publications 2007) (indicating that “[i]n 1972,
the United Nations (UN) rejected the Taiwan government’s claim to represent
China in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), governed by the Chinese
Communist Party”).
63
DAVID K.C. HUANG, JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN TAIWAN: STRATEGIC MODELS
AND THE JUDICIAL YUAN, 1990–1999 237 (GRIN 2019) (2016).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 236–238.
66
Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion § 6II (1948/1972) (Adopted on Apr. 18,
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No.150 [1977],67 but Justices of the second generation frustrated the
political attempts of the National Assembly, holding that
“[p]aragraph 6 of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the
Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist
Rebellion does not alter the term of elected central representatives
under the Constitution.” 68 In other words, members of Congress
were judicially allowed to “continue to exercise their respective
powers”69 only because “there were no vacancies to fill.”70 The de
facto lifelong tenure was simply a pis aller in the eyes of the Justices,
and the demand for de jure lifelong tenure was never a possibility.71
Ten years before Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000],
members of Congress with de facto lifelong tenure were dismissed
by the Justices of the second generation in Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No.261 [1990] on the basis of clausula rebus sic
stantibus. 72 This judicial decision opened the gate for Taiwan’s
peaceful democratisation,73 which was aimed at ending the Chinese
political tradition of lifelong tenure 74 in Taiwan, under which the
Government was ordered that it “[should] schedule, in due course, a
nationwide election of the next members of Congress.” 75 The
Justices also ordered that “those members of the First Congress who
have not been re-elected shall cease exercising their powers no later
than December 31, 1991.”76 The Justices ruled that:
[P]eriodic election of members of Congress is a sine
qua non to reflect the will of the people and implement
1948 by the National Assembly; entered into force on May 10, 1948; abolished on
May 1, 1991 by the President in line with the constitutional court order issued by
the Judicial Yuan in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261 [1990]).
67
See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 238–239.
68
SHIZI NO. 150 JIESHI (釋字第 150 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
150] (1977) (Official translation).
69
SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI, supra note 56 (Official translation).
70
SHIZI NO. 150 JIESHI, supra note 68, at ¶ 2 (Official translation).
71
SHIZI NO.150 JIESHI, supra note 68.
72
HUANG, supra note 63, at 245–247.
73
See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 221–262.
74
LIU, supra note 23, at 58 (indicating that the Chinese “traditional rule [was]
lifetime tenure for the ruler”).
75
SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第 261 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
261] (1990) (Official translation).
76
Id. (Official translation).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

430

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 15

constitutional democracy. Neither J.Y. Interpretation
No. 31, nor Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution,
nor Section 6, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Temporary
Provisions Effective During the Period of National
Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist
Rebellion allow the members of the First Congress to
exercise powers indefinitely.
None of these
provisions was intended to change their terms of
office or prohibit election of new members of
Congress.77
In a nutshell, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] can
be seen as the final instalment of the tetralogy of anti-lifelong tenure
in Taiwan. It summarises the hard work of at least three generations
of Chinese (or Taiwanese) jurists.

III.

METHODOLOGY

This article looks back at Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
499 [2000] from a perspective of twenty years. It analyses the way
on which the legal arguments of unconstitutional constitutional
amendment were constructed by the appellants’ counsels and how the
Justices ruled accordingly. 78 Unlike the German Basic Law
(Grundgesetz), 79 the main characteristic of this case lies in the
absence of an “eternity clause in the Constitution,”80 which meant
that the case turned into a fierce debate on the spirit of the
Constitution81 because the main text of the Constitution was (and still
is) silent. In other words, the merit of this case to the international
world lies in its doctrinal debate over the issues of constitutional
77

Id. (Official translation).
Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499] (2000), with SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI YIJIANSHU
CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN (釋字第 499 號解釋意見書抄本等文件) [Judicial
Yuan Interpretation No. 499 Appendix] (2000).
79
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], § 79 ¶3, translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/PBP4-5G3S] (1949).
80
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at¶ 9.
81
MINGUO XIANFA (民國憲法) [Constitution of the Republic of China] (Adopted
on Dec. 25, 1946, by the Constituent National Assembly convened in Nanking;
promulgated by the Nationalist Government on Jan. 1, 1947; entered into force on
Dec. 25, 1947) (Taiwan).
78
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amending power, popular sovereignty, due process and the nemo dat
rule. The political controversy behind this case, it is beyond the remit
of this article, although it is worth considering separately.

IV.

HAU LUNG—PIN’S INSTRUMENT OF APPEAL
The fundamental hypothesis of constitutionalism
is that power tends to corrupt [and will always be
used] abusively. It would therefore be irrational to
rely entirely on the self-restraint of the designated
organ per se for our constitutional amendments.
[If there is no legal limit to] constitutional
amending power, [it will become] a power that can
ruin the constitution to the extent that no remedy
will be available. 82 —Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh
Ching-Yuan (1999)

The first instrument of appeal enshrined in Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was filed by Congressman Hau LungPin83 with Nigel N.T. Li,84 Esq. (as lead counsel) and Yeh ChingYuan,85 Esq. (as counsel).86 It was submitted to the Judicial Yuan on
October 28, 1999 with the signatures of 112 congressmen and
congresswomen of the Legislative Yuan. 87 With the benefit of
hindsight, it outweighs the other instruments of appeal because it is
no exaggeration to state that the majority opinion of the Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] approved all of the principal assertions
made in this instrument in line with the legal-constitutional theories
provided therein.88
82

JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
Id.
84
LL.B. (Soochow University 1977), LL.M. (National Taiwan University 1980),
and LL.M. (Harvard 1983).
85
LL.B. (National Chengchi University 1994), LL.M. (National Taipei University
1997), LL.M. (UPenn 2002), J.D. (UPenn 2004), and S.J.D. (UPenn 2005).
86
TITAN ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, http://www.titanlaw.com.tw/blog/?p=2458
[https://perma.cc/U72F-H4VW] (last visited 2 February 2020).
87
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
88
Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499] (2000), with SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋)
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] App’x (2000).
83
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The alma mater of Nigel N.T. Li is Harvard,89 whilst Yeh
Ching-Yuan obtained his S.J.D. degree at the University of
Pennsylvania in 2005.90 However, their argument was based on the
German theory of limited constitutional amending power91 originated
by Carl Schmitt, 92 who asserted that no constitutional amendment
should be deemed constitutional if it was incompatible with the
fundamental framework 93 of the Constitution 94 because “the
constitutional amending power is a constituted power.”95 This meant
that according to Li and Yeh, if a constitutional amendment raises
serious doubts about its constitutionality because of “manifest and
gross flaws” 96 (Gravitaets-bzw. Evidenztheorie 97 ), Carl Schmitt’s
concept of the guardian of the constitution, 98 i.e., der Hüter der
Verfassung,99 should be applied to render the amendment judicially
reviewable100 (Prüfungsmaßstab101).
89

LEE AND LI ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW,
http://www.leeandli.com.tw/EN/Professions/3/116.htm [https://perma.cc/FE9XSJQF].
90
TITAN ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, http://www.titanlaw.com.tw/blog/?page_id=634
[https://perma.cc/KGM3-7SDB].
91
See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86.
92
SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 75–87; see also PREUß, supra note 12, at 477–479.
93
Compare GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], § 79 ¶3, translation
at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html
[https://perma.cc/PBP4-5G3S] (1949), with U.S. Const. art. V (1789), and
MINGUO XIANFA § 1 (1947) (Taiwan).
94
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
95
Id. (Authors’ translation); see also SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 91–99 (arguing
that the constitutional amending power is a constituted power rather than a
constituent power. The former is the power originated in the constitution and the
latter is the power that constitutes the constitution. Hence, the former is limited
by the constitution, but the latter is not).
96
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at ¶ 1.
97
SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI (釋字第 419 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
419] ¶ 13 (1996).
98
Compare CARL SCHMITT, DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG [THE GUARDIAN OF
THE CONSTITUTION] 1–11 (Verlag Von J.C.B. Mohr 1931), with SHIZI NO. 499
JIESHI YIJIANSHU CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN (釋字第 499 號解釋意見書抄本等文
件) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 Appendix] (2000).
99
See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS
KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 70–85 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997).
100
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
101
See generally WU GENG, XIAN FA DE JIE SHI YU SHI YONG [THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION] 408–419 (on-file with
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Li and Yeh therefore asserted that it was unconstitutional to
transform the National Assembly from a legislative chamber whose
members should be elected by the people 102 into a legislature in
which seats were apportioned only according to the “votes that the
candidates nominated by each political party and all the independent
candidates receive[d] in the parallel election for the Members of the
Legislative Yuan.” 103 They asserted that such a constitutional
amendment would contradict the principle of popular sovereignty104
provided by the Constitution,105 arguing that the principle must take
priority over the amendment because the principle made up part of
the fundamental framework of the Constitution.106 Accordingly, they
pointed out that the amendment would transform the Republic of
China (Taiwan) from “a democracy of the people” 107 into “a
democracy of political parties,” 108 violating the constitutional
equality clause109 by stopping people from voting for independent
candidates henceforth.110
Li and Yeh also recalled the legendary Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No.261 [1990], in which the Justices affirmed that
“periodic election of members of Congress is a sine qua non to reflect
the will of the people and implement constitutional democracy.”111
Using Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] the Justices
directly “[dismissed] the authoritarian congress and [forced] fresh
and immediate elections,” 112 and Li and Yeh asserted accordingly
author) (2004) (Justice Wu Geng providing the standard of judicial review in
Taiwan).
102
Compare MINGUO XIANFA §§ 25–34 (1947) (Taiwan), with MINGUO XIANFA
amend. § 1 (1997) (Taiwan).
103
See MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan). SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI
OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at Reasoning ¶ 10. JUDICIAL YUAN
INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
104
See generally DANIEL LESSARD LEVIN, REPRESENTING POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 1–194
(State Univ. of New York Press 1999).
105
MINGUO XIANFA § 2 (1947) (Taiwan).
106
See MINGUO XIANFA §§ 1–2 (1947) (Taiwan). JUDICIAL YUAN
INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
107
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
108
Id. (Authors’ translation).
109
MINGUO XIANFA § 7 (1947) (Taiwan).
110
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
111
SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI, supra note 75 (Official translation).
112
HUANG, supra note 63, at 221.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

434

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 15

that the terms of office of the members of Congress could not be selfextended 113 unless the country “has been undergoing a severe
calamity, which makes re-election . . . de facto impossible.”114 They
asserted that it was unconstitutional to extend the terms of office of
National Assembly members by two years and forty-two days115 and
of the members of the Legislative Yuan by five months.116 If the
members of the National Assembly were allowed to alter the lengths
of their terms through a constitutional amendment117 this time, there
would be no reason to prohibit them from doing it again,118 and the
spirit of social contract developed by John Locke119 and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau120 would thus be ruined.121 Li and Yeh further asserted that
Article 8 of the Additional Articles of the Constitution122 embodied
the spirit of social contract, prohibiting the members of the National
Assembly and the Legislative Yuan from increasing their
remuneration or wages.123 “[I]ndividual regulations on increase of
remuneration or pay shall go into effect starting with the subsequent
National Assembly or Legislative Yuan.” 124 Accordingly, Li and
Yeh asserted that this rule—based upon the spirit of social contract—
must also apply to attempts to alter the term of office.125 They stated:
The principle of democracy is based on the spirit of
social contract, and the term of office provided by the
Constitution specifies [our] people’s authorisation.
113

JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5; see also MINGUO XIANFA
amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
114
SHIZI NO.31 JIESHI, supra note 56.
115
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5; see also MINGUO XIANFA
amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
116
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5; see also MINGUO XIANFA
amend. § 4 (1999) (Taiwan).
117
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
118
See JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
119
See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT 1–401
(Whitmore Fenn & C. Brown eds., 1821) (1690).
120
See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 10–153
(George D.H. Cole trans., Augustine Press 2018) (1923).
121
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
122
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 8 (1997) (Taiwan).
123
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5; see also MINGUO XIANFA
amend. § 8 (1997) (Taiwan).
124
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 8 (1997) (Taiwan) (Official translation).
125
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
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Apart from in a state of emergency, under which it is
necessary to de facto extend the term of office for the
sake of [our] constitutionalism, no delegate shall have
power to alter the authorisation without positive
instruction by [our] people. 126 —Nigel N.T. Li and
Yeh Ching-Yuan (1999)
Li and Yeh finally asserted that the disputed constitutional
amendments 127 were passed by the National Assembly in undue
process.128 The second and third readings were both rigged by secret
ballot, which violated the Self-Stipulated Rules of Assembly of
1999.129 The Justices affirmed their general respect to the Legislative
Yuan, 130 ruling that parliamentary privilege was applied under
circumstances in which the bills were passed when “the
congressmen/women were busy with ‘legislative brawling’ in the
Legislative Yuan” 131 “unless it is in clear contravention to the
Constitution.”132 Li and Yeh asserted that rigging a constitutional
amendment by secret ballot was by its nature 133 “in clear
contravention to the Constitution”134 because it constituted legislative
unaccountability. 135 They cited the concurring opinion of Justice
David Souter in Nixon v. United States,136 in which Souter argued that
“[n]ot all [judicial] interference is inappropriate or disrespectful”137
depending on “how importunately the occasion demands the
answer.”138 Accordingly, “if a secret ballot is allowed, how can the
members of the National Assembly be accountable to the people in
126

Id. (Authors’ translation).
MINGUO XIANFA amend. §§ 1, 4 (1999) (Taiwan).
128
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
129
Guomindahuiyishiguize (國民大會議事規則) [Rules of Assembly of the
National Assembly] art. 38II (1948 & 1999).
130
See generally SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI (釋字第 342 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 342] (1994).
131
HUANG, supra note 63, at 291.
132
SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 132 (Official translation); see also SHIZI NO.
419 JIESHI, supra note 97.
133
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
134
SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 132.
135
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
136
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253 (1993) (Souter, D., concurring).
137
Id.
138
Id.
127
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accordance with Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.401 [1996],”139 and
why should the Justices show their general respect140 to the National
Assembly in such an importunate occasion?

V.

CHENG PAO—CHING’S INSTRUMENTS OF
APPEAL

Three instruments of appeal were filed by Congressman
Cheng Pao-Ching, 141 and according to Justice Sun Sen-Yen, 142
Dennis T.C. Tang143 (who was to become a Justice in 2011) was the
author. The first instrument was co-signed by 79 congressmen and
congresswomen of the Legislative Yuan, 144 and there were 80
signatures for the second and third instruments.145 All of these were
submitted to the Judicial Yuan on October 28, 1999.146 Meanwhile,
it is interesting to note that Tang reminded the then Justices of the
people’s anger (Min-Yuan) repeatedly throughout the instruments.147
The first argument proposed by Dennis T.C. Tang was that
fundamental rights and popular sovereignty set the legal boundary for
constitutional amendments, although it was arguable whether the
constitutional amending power should be legally limited or not.148
Tang would have been surprised by Lord Hoffmann’s famous dictum:
“Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental
principles of human rights,” 149 because the model of unlimited
constitutional amending power, including the British150 and Weimar

139

JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
See generally SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 132.
141
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
142
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Sun S-Y, partial concurring).
143
LL.B. (National Taiwan University 1978), LL.M. (National Taiwan University
1981), LL.M. (Harvard 1984), and S.J.D. (Tulane 1989).
144
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115
(appeal taken from Eng.).
150
See ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3–4 (8th ed., Macmillan 1915).
140
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German151 models, supported the idea that “[t]he constraints upon its
exercise by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal.”152 In other
words, Tang probably undervalued the gravity of unlimited
constitutional amending power, but he was keenly aware of the
importance of the core arguments of fundamental rights and popular
sovereignty.153 Like Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh Ching-Yuan, he recalled
the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], which
asserted that periodical re-election was a fundamental right (the right
to vote154) and the concretisation of popular sovereignty.155 As such,
it was unconstitutional for the National Assembly to self-extended
their term of office retrospectively.156
Unlike Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh Ching-Yuan, Tang was not
opposed to secret ballots 157 and offered no opinion about the
transformation of the National Assembly. 158 But he was very
sensitive to the concept of self-extending the term of office.159 His
second argument was aimed at the Justices, persuading them into
believing that judicial interference was the solution provided by the
Constitution 160 under such a scenario. According to Tang, “apart
from the Justices’ judicial review power over the legal boundary of
constitutional amendments, no political power can constrain the
National Assembly to power expansion, constitutional derogation
and the destruction of liberal democracy in reality.”161 Hence, he
asserted that “the Justices are the final guardians of [our] Constitution,
with the sanctified responsibility of protecting the spirit of [our]
Constitution,”162 and they “should not dismiss the case in accordance
151

GERHARD ANSCHÜTZ, DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS VOM 11
AUGUST 1919 [The Constitution of the German Reich from August 11, 1919]
351–352 (Georg Stilke ed., 1929).
152
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115
(appeal taken from Eng.).
153
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
154
MINGUO XIANFA § 17 (1947) (Taiwan).
155
MINGUO XIANFA §§ 1–2 (1947) (Taiwan). JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION,
supra note 5.
156
Id.
157
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Sun S-Y, partial concurring).
158
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
159
Id.
160
MINGUO XIANFA §§ 171–173 (1947) (Taiwan).
161
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
162
Id. (Authors’ translation).
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with the political question doctrine or gerichtsfreier Hoheitsakt.”163
In a nutshell, his argument covered the notion of judicial
supremacy164 or judicialisation of politics,165 supporting the Justices
to become substitute lawmakers, i.e., Ersatzgesetzgeber.166

VI.

HUNG CHAO—NAN’S INSTRUMENT OF
APPEAL
A democratic decision shall be respected even
though it is inappropriate or ineffective, but it
cannot derogate or even destroy democratism per
se.167—Su Yeong-Chin (1999)

The final instrument of appeal enshrined in Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was filed by Congressman Hung ChaoNan, 168 and was written by Su Yeong-Chin, 169 who went on to
become Vice-Chief Justice in 2010. The instrument was delivered to
the Judicial Yuan on November 18, 1999,170 bearing the signatures of
102 congressmen and congresswomen of the Legislative Yuan. 171
Public opposition (Min-Zhong-Fan-Dui) was also mentioned in this
instrument of appeal.172
The first argument proposed by Su Yeong-Chin was based
upon the nemo dat rule, i.e., nemo dat quod non habet,173 by which

163

Id. (Authors’ translation).
See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 33–385.
165
See generally Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 253–274 (Robert E. Goodin ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2011).
166
See generally Christine Landfried, The Judicialization of Politics in Germany,
15(2) INT. POL.SCI. REV. 113, 113–124 (1994).
167
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
168
Id.
169
LL.B. (National Taiwan University 1972) and Dr.Iur. (München 1981).
170
This last submission represented the general attitude of the
congressmen/women of the Legislative Yuan of the ruling Nationalist Party of
China. Perhaps this is the reason why it was submitted 21 days later than the
other submissions. JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
See generally ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 790 (4th ed.,
Cavendish Publishing 2005).
164

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss3/3

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

439

he asserted174 that it was unconstitutional for the National Assembly
to self-extend their term of office because “one cannot give that
which one does not have.”175 Applying this English legal rule implies
the notion of limited constitutional amending power 176 per se.
However, the merit of the nemo dat argument lies in Su’s excellent
interpretation of the legitimacy of the ruling power.177 He stated:
The spirit of democracy indicates that “the ruler shall
rule by the consent of the ruled.” Election, therefore,
is the necessary procedure of collective trust,
authorising the legitimacy of exercising state power to
the ruler. The purpose of re-election when the term of
office is due is to reconfirm the democratic legitimacy
of the ruler.178—Su Yeong-Chin (1999)
In other words, Su argued that the legitimacy of the members
of the National Assembly in attempting to exercise constitutional
amending powers was rooted in holding periodical elections of the
chamber at the due time. The National Assembly could not therefore
extend their term of office by two years and forty-two days, 179
because “one cannot give that which one does not have.” 180 Su
asserted that the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261
[1990] affirmed the nemo dat rule, 181 “drawing the line between
democracy and autocracy.”182
The second argument proposed by Su was based upon popular
sovereignty,183 by which he asserted that it was unconstitutional to
hold secret ballots for constitutional amendments, because the
process would deliberately disconnect the people from their
174

JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
HUDSON, supra note 173, at 790.
176
See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86.
177
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
178
Id. (Authors’ translation).
179
Id.
180
HUDSON, supra note 173, at 790.
181
Compare ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 790 (4th ed., Cavendish
Publishing 2005), with SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI YIJIANSHU CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN
(釋字第 499 號解釋意見書抄本等文件) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499
Appendix] (2000); see also SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI, supra note 75.
182
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
183
MINGUO XIANFA §§ 1–2 (1947) (Taiwan).
175
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representatives. 184
“Popular sovereignty would become
parliamentary sovereignty if a constitutional amendment could be
passed by secret ballot. Regardless of the bona fide motive as well
as the desirable outcome, [the transformation] itself is incompatible
with the framework of the Constitution.” 185 Su argued that the
disputed constitutional amendments passed by the National
Assembly in undue process 186 were judicially reviewable in toto,
because their amending “procedures contained manifest and gross
flaws”187 “which could otherwise never be redressed at all.”188
Su’s final argument was that liberal democratism provided the
boundary for constitutional amendments, which reflected the
commonly held opinion of legal-constitutional scholarship in
Taiwan. 189 However, it is interesting to note that he—as a legal
counsel of the congressmen and congresswomen of the Legislative
Yuan from the ruling Nationalist Party of China—expressed no
opinion about the transformation of the National Assembly.190 It is
therefore puzzling as to how Su defined popular sovereignty and
liberal democratism if the transformation of the National Assembly
was allowed.191 Perhaps, as a legal counsel, he was not in a good
position to illustrate his opinion freely. Consequently, he chose to
make implications instead, reaffirming liberal democratism as the
fundamental framework of the Constitution, whether or not the ban
against altering it was written in the Constitution.192

VII.

JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION NO. 499
[2000]

Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was a typical
separation of powers game.193 The Interpretation came about after
184

JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
Id. (Authors’ translation).
186
MINGUO XIANFA amend. §§ 1, 4 (1999) (Taiwan).
187
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3, at Reasoning ¶ 1.
188
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. (Su Yeong-Chin arguing as to whether the “inappropriateness” of the
transformation constituted a violation of the Constitution).
192
Id. (Su Yeong-Chin elaborating the German concept of
Verfassungsdurchbrechung).
193
See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 274–287.
185
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differences between the Legislative Yuan (appellant organ) and the
National Assembly (respondent organ) “in terms of allegations of
unconstitutionality by the appellant organ, seeking a judicial decision
that could constitutionally force the respondent organ to back down
from its original position.”194 It was filed by Hau Lung-Pin (The New
Party) and Cheng Pao-Ching (Democratic Progressive Party) on
October 28, 1999,195 and by Hung Chao-Nan (Nationalist Party of
China) on November 18, 1999.196 The en banc decision197 was heard
by the Justices on November 26, 1999198 and promulgated on March
24, 2000.199 According to Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng,200 the
late Justice Wu Geng 201 was the main author representing the
majority opinion. 202 Six judicial opinions were submitted,
comprising two partial concurring opinions, 203 two concurring
opinions,204 one concurring and partial dissenting opinion205 and one
dissenting opinion.206 The case was a remarkable one in Taiwan’s
legal history because the Justices struck down the Fifth Amendment
of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of
China.207 The Justices ruled that:

194

Id. at 270.
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
196
Id.
197
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (recording the signatures of all the sixteen
Justices).
198
R.O.C JUDICIAL YUAN, http://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/zhtw/categories/milestonelist/y21lmta1 [https://perma.cc/6P7R-QFDM] (last visited
Sept. 18, 2020).
199
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2.
200
A.A. (Tainan Normal School 1956), LL.B. (National Taiwan University 1960),
and Dr.Iur. (Heidelberg 1966).
201
LL.B. (National Taiwan University 1962), M.A. (National Taiwan University
1966), and Dr.Iur. (Wein 1977).
202
See Weng Yueh-Sheng, Mian Huai Da Fa Guan Wu Meng Geng Xian Sheng
[In Memory of the Late Justice Wu Geng], 22 ZHONG YAN YUAN FA XUE QI KAN
[ACADEMIA SINICA LAW JOURNAL] i, iii (2018).
203
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Lin Y-M & Sun S-Y, partial concurring).
204
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Su J-H & Lai I-J, concurring).
205
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Chen C-N, concurring and partial
dissenting).
206
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting).
207
MINGUO XIANFA amend. §§ 1, 4, 9–10 (1999) (Taiwan).
195
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[T]he disputed Articles 1, 4, 9, and 10 of the
Additional Articles shall be null and void from the
date of announcement of this Interpretation. The
Additional Articles promulgated on July 21, 1997,
shall continue to apply. It is so ordered.208

VIII.

DECISION ONE: DER HÜTER DER
VERFASSUNG

At the intersection of constitutionalism and
democratism, no freedom (or power) shall be de
jure unlimited. When the Constitution is amended,
it shall comply with democratism per se. However,
this does not mean that it is free from the limit of
constitutionalism. 209 —Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung
(2000)
Whether a constitutional amendment is judicially
reviewable 210 is always a theoretical dilemma, 211 and the first
decision made by the majority of the Justices in Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was that the Justices are empowered
by the Constitution 212 not only to interpret the Constitution in
general213 but also to govern “the enforcement and amendment of the
Constitution.” 214 This meant that “[d]oubts or ambiguities arising
therefrom are also subject to interpretation by [the Judicial Yuan].”215
It is interesting to note that the Justices recalled Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No.261 [1990] through a contradictory proposition,216
208

SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, supra note 3.
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Su J-H, concurring) (Authors’ translation).
210
See generally KEMAL GÖZLER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 3–103 (Ekin Press 2008).
211
Compare Sri Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar
(and Other Cases) (1952) SCR 89 (India), with Kesavananda Bharati
Sripadagalvaru and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).
212
MINGUO XIANFA § 173 (1947) (Taiwan).
213
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 2.
214
Id. (Official translation).
215
Id. (Official translation).
216
See generally B.P. BAIRAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SYLLOGISTIC LOGIC: WITH
SELECTED HISTORY, THEORIES AND READINGS IN WESTERN ETHICS 197 (Katha
Publishing 2005).
209
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suggesting that the National Assembly should not apply for judicial
review when it demanded the Court’s authority217 and challenging the
Court’s judicial review power when it did not want to be interfered
with.218 The Justices ruled that:
As indicated above, the Constitutional Court has
jurisdiction over constitutional interpretation in cases
of doubts or ambiguities arising with respect to the
procedure of amendment. The constitutionality of the
internal procedures of the authority concerned, such as
the scope of parliamentary autonomy and its limits,
involves the choice of various standards of review by
the Constitutional Court.219
The above decision was obviously based upon Carl Schmitt’s
concept of the guardian of the constitution, 220 i.e., der Hüter der
Verfassung. 221 Although this argument can be found on the
instrument of appeal submitted by Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh ChingYuan, 222 the credit is probably not theirs, because it was the then
Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng who introduced this concept into
Taiwan.223 The main author of the majority opinion,224 Justice Wu
Geng, was also a well-known expert on the scholarship of Schmitt.225
Unlike the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 226 there was “[n]o
eternity clause in the Constitution” 227 of the Republic of China
(Taiwan). However, the Justices still ruled in line with the German
217

SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 2.
Cf. id.
219
Id. at ¶ 7 (Official translation).
220
See generally CARL SCHMITT, DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG [THE GUARDIAN
OF THE CONSTITUTION] 1–11 (Verlag Von J.C.B. Mohr 1931).
221
See DYZENHAUS, supra note 99, at 70–85.
222
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
223
See generally Weng Yueh-Sheng, Xian Fa Zhi Wei Hu Zhe [The Guardian of
the Constitution], 17 XIAN ZHENG SI CHAO [THOUGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM]
146, 146–148 (1972).
224
See Weng, supra note 202, i, iii.
225
See WU, supra note 101, at 607 (Yen Chueh-An sharing his opinion about the
influence of Carl Schmitt upon Justice Wu Geng).
226
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], § 79 ¶3, translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/PBP4-5G3S] (1949).
227
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 9 (Official translation).
218
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theory of limited constitutional amending power228 originated by Carl
Schmitt229 and held that:
[I]f a constitutional provision, which is integral to the
essential nature of the Constitution and underpins the
constitutional normative order, is open to change
through a constitutional amendment, permitting such
a constitutional amendment would bring down the
constitutional normative order in its entirety. Such a
constitutional amendment in and of itself should be
denied legitimacy . . . . [I]n the event that a
constitutional
amendment
contravenes
the
constitutional order of liberal democracy, as
emanating from the said foundational principles, it
betrays the trust of the people, shakes the foundation
of the Constitution, and thus must be checked by other
constitutional organs. Such a check on the designated
body that makes amendments is part of the selfdefense mechanism of the Constitution.230
In other words, the majority opinion in Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] had no intention of invalidating
parliamentary privilege,231 but was instead designed to highlight the
criterion of the abuse of legislative power in accordance with the
principle
of
gravity
defect
control
(Gravitaets-bzw.
Evidenztheorie232). The Justices therefore reminded the members of
the National Assembly of their “oath of allegiance to the Constitution,
whereby they are to be loyal to the Constitution,”233 lecturing them
that “[c]onstitutional loyalty also applies when the National
Assembly exercises its amending power.” 234 This meant that the
228

See generally O’DONOGHUE, supra note 11, at 54–86.
SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 75–87; see also PREUß, supra note 12, at 477–479.
230
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 9 (Official translation).
231
Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499] (2000), with SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI (釋字第 342 號解釋)
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 342] (1994), and SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI (釋字第
381 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 381] (1995).
232
SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI, supra note 97, at Reasoning ¶ 13.
233
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 9 (Official translation).
234
Id. (Official translation).
229
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Justices would not endorse all the legislative activities “[falling]
within the scope of parliamentary autonomy, and thus … [avoiding]
the legal effects of manifest and gross procedural flaws.”235 In the
eyes of the Justices as the Guardians of the Constitution of the
Republic of China,236 they would sustain the National Assembly’s
legal claim for parliamentary privilege (or autonomy) when it “[deals]
with a constitutional amendment bill . . . in conformity with the
constitutional order of liberal democracy.”237
The constitution is [not only] the supreme law of the
land [. . . ] [but also] the law of politics by nature.238—
Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung (2000)
The way in which the majority opinion in Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499 [2000] evaluated the political question
doctrine239 was thus formulised. The Justices would and could, if
they choose,240 intervene in political questions. The Constitution is
“the law of politics by nature,”241 which meant that the Guardians of
the Constitution of the Republic of China would not allow political
decisions “[bringing] down the constitutional normative order in its
entirety,” 242 although they would respect political decisions in
general.243

235

Id. at ¶ 7 (Official translation).
See generally VINCENT SZE & ROBERT H.C. TSAI, THE GRAND JUSTICE’ ROLE
IN PROCESS OF THE R.O.C. DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM, in THE REPUBLIC
OF CHINA CONSTITUTIONAL COURT REPORTER: INTERPRETATIONS NO .1–233
(1949–1988) 699–720 (ROC Judicial Yuan ed., ROC Judicial Yuan 2007).
237
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 7 (Official translation).
238
Id. (Su J-H, concurring) (Authors’ translation).
239
See generally DAVID K.C. HUANG, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE IN
TAIWAN: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TAIWAN’S JUDICIAL REVIEW AND JUDICIAL
YUAN INTERPRETATION NO. 328 [1993] 4–39 (GRIN 2019) (2012).
240
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 7 (ruling that the
constitutionality of politics, including parliamentary privilege, “involves the
choice of various standards of review by the [Justices]”).
241
Id. (Su J-H, concurring) (Authors’ translation).
242
Id. (Official translation).
243
Id.; see also SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130; SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI (釋字
第 381 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 381] (1995). It is important to
note that the Judicial Yuan has remained a very powerful court since the 1990s. It
even dismissed the authoritarian congress and opened the gate for Taiwan’s
236
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Although they did not disagree with the majority opinion,
Justices Su Jyun-Hsiung and Chen Chi-Nan were concerned about
it.244 They both asserted that the Justices could behave much more
respectfully towards the legislative power by ordering the National
Assembly to re-amend the Constitution in accordance with Judicial
Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000], instead of striking down
disputed constitutional amendments arbitrarily. 245 Their argument
was that as the guardians of the constitution, the Justices could decide
what was constitutional and what was not (constitutionalism), but
they were not entitled to make political decisions (democratism).246
This meant that the Justices could suspend any unconstitutional
constitutional amendment, but not invalid it completely.247 Whilst
the outcome may be the same, the attitude is very different.
The only dissenting opinion in Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No. 499 [2000] was submitted by Justice Tseng Hua-Sun, 248 who
asserted that there was “[n]o eternity clause in the Constitution”249 of
the Republic of China, and therefore he found no reason why the
constitutional amending power was limited.250 He did not oppose
Schmitt’s theory in general,251 but considered that it must be amended
into the Constitution before being applied.252

IX.

DECISION TWO: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
Our country had undergone the periods of partyled military control and of party-led political
tutelage since its establishment, and the ruling

peaceful democratisation via the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261
[1990]. See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 221–262.
244
Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Su Jyun-Hsiung, concurring), with SHIZI NO. 499
JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Chen
C-N, concurring and partial dissenting).
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Chen C-N, concurring and partial
dissenting).
248
Id. (Tseng H-S, dissenting).
249
Id. at Reasoning ¶ 9 (Official translation).
250
Id. (Tseng H-S, dissenting).
251
SCHMITT, supra note 12, at 91–99.
252
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting).
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political party and the Government were
politically fused. Hence, equality amongst all
political parties is a distinctive doctrine embodied
in the Constitution by our Pater Constitutio [. . . .]
The demand for equality amongst all political
parties includes not only its literal meaning but
also the demand for equal rights to political
participation
amongst
all
independent
candidates. 253 —Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh ChingYuan (1999)
Whether it is constitutional to transform the members of the
National Assembly 254 from representatives of the people 255 to
representatives of political parties,256 the majority of the Justices in
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] affirmed the principle of
popular sovereignty 257 and declared this transformation
unconstitutional.258 It is important to note that the Justices appeared
impatient as they lectured the National Assembly that “[n]o such an
electoral system can be found among advanced democracies.”259 In
the eyes of the Justices as the Guardians of the Constitution, this
unprecedented system was totally “incompatible with the protection
of political rights under the Constitution” 260 because “individual
independent candidates would not be elected based on their own ideas
and policies pitched at the electors.”261 The Justices held that:
Article 1 of the Additional Articles adopted by the
Third National Assembly on September 4, 1999,
stipulates that, from the Fourth National Assembly on,
the seats of the Delegates shall be apportioned
according to the popular votes that the candidates
253

JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
Id. (asserting that the Republic of China would be transformed from “a
democracy of the people” into “a democracy of political parties”).
255
Compare MINGUO XIANFA §§ 25–34 (1947) (Taiwan), with MINGUO XIANFA
amend. § 1 (1997) (Taiwan).
256
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
257
MINGUO XIANFA §§ 1, 2 (1947) (Taiwan).
258
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2.
259
Id. at Reasoning ¶ 10 (Official translation).
260
Id. (Official translation).
261
Id. (Official translation).
254
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nominated by each political party and all the
independent candidates receive in the parallel election
for the Members of the Legislative Yuan, which
differs from the National Assembly in function and
competence. The Delegates who are to be selected
pursuant to the challenged apportionment method but
not directly elected by the people, are merely the
representatives appointed by respective political
parties according to their share of seats in the
Legislative Yuan. Accordingly, this amendment is
incompatible with the spirit of Article 25 of the
Constitution, which provides that the National
Assembly, on behalf of the people, exercises
sovereign rights. It leads to a conflict between two
constitutional provisions. All the powers conferred by
Article 1 of the Additional Articles are presupposed to
be exercised by the Delegates elected by the people.
Should the Delegates, selected pursuant to the
challenged apportionment method, be allowed to
exercise the powers of the said Article 1, the
fundamental principles of constitutional democracy
would be thereby violated. Hence, the disputed
Additional Article amending the method of election
for the Delegates is incompatible with the
constitutional order of liberal democracy.262
The fundamental disagreement between the Justices and the
National Assembly on this transformation lies only in what kind of
decisions can and cannot be made democratically. For example, could
a specific person be chosen to pay all the bills for the rest of the people
democratically, i.e., as a tyranny of the majority?263 If the answer is
no, how could the members of the National Assembly “merely
representatives appointed by individual political parties, rather than
representatives of the people”264 be allowed to “[exercise] sovereign

262

Id.
See generally DONALD L. BEAHM, CONCEPTIONS OF AND CORRECTIONS TO
MAJORITARIAN TYRANNY 1–102 (Lexington Books 2002).
264
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 10 (Official translation).
263
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[powers] on behalf of the people” 265 simply because the disputed
constitutional amendment266 was passed democratically?267 In other
words, could the decision to terminate democracy be legitimately
made democratically, as Adolf Hitler’s Enabling Act of 1933, i.e.,
Das Ermächtigungsgesetz vom 24. März 1933,268 or the Coronation
of Napoléon in 1804 were?269 In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
499 [2000], the Justices said no and ruled:
[I]f they continue to hold the following powers to alter
the state territory (Article 4 of the Constitution), to
elect the Vice President when the said office becomes
vacant, to initiate a recall of the President or the Vice
President, to vote on the impeachment of the President
or the Vice President, to amend the Constitution, to
approve constitutional amendment proposals put forth
by the Legislative Yuan, and to confirm presidential
appointments to the Judicial, Examination, and
Control Yuans (Article 1 of the Additional Articles),
which, by nature, should be vested in elected political
representatives, it will not only result in evident
normative conflict with Article 25 of the Constitution
but also contravene the fundamental principle of the
democratic state under Article 1 of the Constitution.
Hence, the disputed Additional Articles concerning
the allocation of the seats of the National Assembly
are incompatible with the constitutional order of
liberal democracy.270
Justice Tseng Hua-Sun was the only Justice who approved.271
He argued in line with the Preamble to the Additional Articles of the
265

Id. (Official translation).
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
267
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2.
268
Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich [Law to Remedy the
Distress of People and Reich], Mar. 24, 1933, RGBL I at 141 (Ger.).
269
See generally STEVEN ENGLUND, NAPOLEON: A POLITICAL LIFE 243–247
(Harvard Univ. Press 2004).
270
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
499] Reasoning ¶ 10 (2000) (Official translation).
271
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting).
266

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

450

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 15

Constitution of the Republic of China, 272 asserting that this
transformation was “[t]o meet the requisites of the nation prior to
national unification” 273 only. 274 He therefore blamed the majority
opinion for pedantry and dogmatism.275

X.

DECISION THREE: NEMO DAT QUOD NON
HABET
In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990],
[the Justices] went out of their way to reiterate the
necessity of periodical re-elections to democracy
and constitutionalism. The truth expounded
therefrom is self-evident to the extent that no
additional interpretation is needed. 276 —Dennis
T.C. Tang (1999)

For historical reasons, 277 the idea of whether it was
constitutional to extend the terms of office of the then members of the
National Assembly by two years and forty-two days278 and of the then
members of the Legislative Yuan by five months279 was a political
taboo in Taiwan.280 Anyone who attempted to do such a thing would
anger the public immediately.281 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
499 [2000] was the last attempt in the Republic of China’s (Taiwan)
political history to end the Chinese political tradition of life tenure
forever.282 The Justices ruled:

272

MINGUO XIANFA amend. pmbl. (1997) (Taiwan).
Id. (Official translation).
274
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting).
275
Id.
276
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
277
See generally SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI, supra note 56; SHIZI NO. 150 JIESHI, supra
note 68; SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI, supra note 75.
278
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
279
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4 (1999) (Taiwan).
280
See generally HUANG, , supra note 63, at 221–262.
281
E.g., JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Dennis T.C. Tang and
Su Yeong-Chin stating public anger in their instruments of appeal respectively).
282
The merit of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] is that if the
extension of the term of office by two years and forty-two days was prohibited,
there would have been no possibility of life tenure.
273
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Pursuant to the principle of popular sovereignty, the
power and authority of political representatives
originate directly from the authorization of the people.
Hence, the legitimacy of representative democracy
lies in the adherence of elected political
representatives to their social contract with the
electorate. Its cardinal principle is that the new
election must take place at the end of the fixed
electoral term unless just cause exists for not holding
the election. Failing that, representative democracy
will be devoid of legitimacy. J.Y. Interpretation No.
261 held that “periodic election of members of
Congress is a sine qua non to reflect the will of the
people and implement constitutional democracy” to
that effect. The just cause for not holding the election
alluded to above must be consistent with the holdings
of J.Y. Interpretation No. 31, which stipulated, “The
State has been undergoing a severe calamity, which
has made the election of both the Second Legislative
Yuan and the Second Control Yuan de facto
impossible.” In this case, no just cause for not holding
re-elections can be found to justify the disputed
extension of the terms of both the Third National
Assembly and the Fourth Legislative Yuan. Such an
extension of the terms as effectuated by amending the
said two provisions of the Additional Articles is not in
conformity with the principle set out above.
Furthermore, the self-extension of its own term by the
Third National Assembly contravenes the principle of
conflict of interest and is also incompatible with the
constitutional order of liberal democracy.283
It is important to note that the concept of a term of office
contradicts the Chinese tradition originated in the mandate of
heaven. 284 This tradition states that “rulers are empowered by

283

SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Official translation).
See generally JOHN S. MAJOR & CONSTANCE A. COOK, ANCIENT CHINA: A
HISTORY 121 (Routledge 2017).

284

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

452

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 15

Heaven,”285 which means that “[t]he leader enjoys lifelong tenure of
office.”286 In Taiwan, the change to this was made by the Justices287
in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], ruling per incuriam
that the “periodic election of members of Congress is a sine qua non
to reflect the will of the people and implement constitutional
democracy.”288 So when the National Assembly extended its term of
office,289 the act was politically construed as the restoration of the old
tradition,290 which nobody accepted. If the National Assembly was
permitted to extend its term this time, there would be no reason to
prohibit its members from doing so again.291 The Justices therefore
ruled that:
The authority concerned further argues that the selfextension of the term of office of the Third National
Assembly is part of parliamentary reform [. . . ]
parliamentary reform is always underpinned by
structural or functional alteration. Yet, in the disputed
constitutional amendment, no change has been made
as to the functions of the National Assembly. Granted,
changes in the method of election are part of structural
alteration, but leaving aside the question as to whether
the “derivative” type of proportional representation in
the method of election of the National Assembly,
which the disputed Additional Articles adopt in the
place of the multi-member district electoral system,
can be considered a genuine election, the change in the
method of election of the National Assembly does not
285

Id.
ORVILLE SCHELL, MANDATE OF HEAVEN: THE LEGACY OF TIANANMEN
SQUARE AND THE NEXT GENERATION OF CHINA’S LEADERS 69 (Simon & Schuster
1994) (criticising the political leaders of the People’s Republic of China, China,
although the situation was exactly the same in the Republic of China, Taiwan,
before Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261 [1990] was promulgated).
287
See generally HUANG, supra note 63, at 221–262.
288
SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI, supra note 75 (Official translation).
289
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan); MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4
(1999) (Taiwan).
290
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (showing that all the
instruments of appeal referred to this argument and none of which read it without
malice).
291
Id.
286
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necessarily lead to the disputed extension of the term.
Even assuming the argument of the authority
concerned that the disputed extension of the term will
be conducive to parliamentary reform, there is no
sound fit between the means and the end.292
In other words, the Justices ruled in line with the nemo dat
rule, i.e., nemo dat quod non habet,293 holding that no term of office
could be extended because no state organisation was authorised by
the Constitution to do so,294 unless the country was “undergoing a
severe calamity, which makes re-election . . . de facto impossible.”295
If the terms of office of the members of Congress had to be altered,
the alteration “shall go into effect starting with the subsequent
National Assembly or Legislative Yuan.”296 The Justices ruled:
Article 8 of the Additional Articles provides: “The
remuneration or pay of the Delegates of the National
Assembly and the Members of the Legislative Yuan
shall be regulated by statute. Except for general
annual adjustments, individual regulations on the
increase of remuneration or pay shall go into effect
starting with the subsequent National Assembly or
Legislative Yuan.” What this provision sets out is
more than the principle that all political
representatives shall avoid conflict of interest in
carrying out their powers. It a fortiori (a minore ad
maius) stipulates: In light of the provision that the
increase of remuneration or pay shall not apply until
the subsequent National Assembly, the disputed selfextension of the term of office is evidently
incompatible with the principle of conflict of interest
as set out in the Constitution. In sum, the petitioners’
claim that the disputed extension of the term of the
292

SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 11 (Official translation).
See generally ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 790 (4th ed.,
Cavendish Publishing 2005).
294
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2.
295
SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI, supra note 56 (Official translation).
296
MINGUO XIANFA amend. §8 (1997) (Taiwan) (Official translation). SHIZI NO.
499 JIESHI, supra note 2.
293
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Third National Assembly contravenes the
constitutional order of liberal democracy and results
in a normative conflict with Article 8 of the Additional
Articles is sustained.297
In Justice Chen Chi-Nan’s concurring and partial dissenting
opinion, he argued that he would barely accept the disputed extension
of the terms of office to be constitutional even if the people as the
sovereigns were to ratify it in an ex post facto referendum. 298
However, Justice Tseng Hua-Sun disapproved.299 He argued that the
Justices had no power to review the quality of political decisions,300
thus implying his preference over unlimited constitutional amending
power.301 Furthermore, he considered the disputed extension of the
terms of office to be part of the constitutional reform “[meeting] the
requisites of the nation prior to national unification,”302 insofar as “it
is difficult to conclude that it is incompatible with the
Constitution.”303

XI.

DECISION FOUR: DUE PROCESS OF
LEGISLATION

As a constituted state organisation, the National
Assembly is empowered to amend the
Constitution [exclusively]. If the due process of
amending the Constitution is determined by the
main text of the Constitution only, no state power
can check the National Assembly . . . . [And] if the
National Assembly has the parliamentary
privilege to violate its Self-Stipulated Rules of
Assembly, it will put itself above the Constitution
297

SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 11 (2000) (Official
translation).
298
Id. (Chen C-N, concurring and partial dissenting).
299
Id. (Tseng H-S, dissenting).
300
Id.
301
See generally R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms
[2000] 2 AC 115 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hoffmann asserting that “[t]he
constraints upon . . . Parliament are ultimately political, not legal”).
302
MINGUO XIANFA amend. pmbl. (1997) (Taiwan) (Official translation).
303
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting) (Authors’
translation).
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and how can liberal democratism and
constitutionalism be established under such a
system?304—Nigel N.T. Li and Yeh Ching-Yuan
(1999)
Whether it was constitutional for the National Assembly to
amend the Constitution by secret ballot, violating the Self-Stipulated
Rules of Assembly of 1999, 305 depends on how far the National
Assembly can take its parliamentary privilege. 306 In the Judicial
Yuan’s previous decisions,307 the Justices respected the Congress’s308
claim for parliamentary privilege 309 “unless it is in clear
contravention to the Constitution.” 310 However, amending the
Constitution by secret ballot represented a step too far, despite the
fact that the main text of the Constitution was (and is) silent.311 The
Justices ruled:
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Constitutional amendment greatly affects the stability
of the constitutional order and the welfare of the
people and must be therefore faithfully carried out by
the designated body in accordance with the principle
of due process. Constitutional amendment is a direct
embodiment of popular sovereignty. The amendment
process requires openness and transparency, which
enable democratic deliberation through rational
communication and thus lay the foundation for the
304

JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5 (Authors’ translation).
GUOMINDAHUIYISHIGUIZE (國民大會議事規則) [Rules of Assembly of the
National Assembly] art. § 38II (1948 & 1999).
306
E.g., SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI , supra note 130; SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI, supra note
243.
307
Id.; see also SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI, supra note 97.
308
See generally DAVID K.C. HUANG, SUN YAT-SEN AND THREE NOTABLE
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN THE CHINESE CONSTITUTIONS 20–22 (GRIN
2019) (2009).
309
Compare SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI (釋字第 342 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No.342] (1994), with SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI (釋字第 381 號解釋)
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 381] (1995).
310
SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130 (Official translation); see also SHIZI NO.
419 JIESHI, supra note 97.
311
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2.
305
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legitimacy of a constitutional state. [. . . ] In the
enactment and amendment of the Additional Articles,
the process of the National Assembly shall be open
and transparent. It shall abide by Article 174 of the
Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the
National Assembly (hereinafter “Rules of the National
Assembly”) so as to live up to the reasonable
expectations and the trust of the people. Accordingly,
Article 38, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of the National
Assembly concerning the secret ballot, as enacted by
the National Assembly pursuant to Article 1,
Paragraph 9 of the Additional Articles promulgated on
August 1, 1994, shall be interpreted in a restrictive
way, when applied to the readings of any
constitutional amendment bill. [. . . ] The amendment
process for the disputed Additional Articles, which
passed the third reading by the National Assembly on
September 4, 1999, contravenes the principle of
openness and transparency as set out above and is not
in conformity with Article 38, Paragraph 2 of the
Rules of the National Assembly.312
Why was it unconstitutional to vote on a constitutional
amendment by secret ballot? To cope with this question when the
main text of the constitution is silent, Anthony Stephen King
provided a theoretical insight into the compass of constitutions:
“Constitution . . . are never—to repeat, never—written down. They
might possibly in principle be written down, but in practice they never
are.”313 That is, there are connotative and extensive314 constituents
of constitution and “in practice they [are] never [written down].”315
312

Id. (Official translation).
ANTHONY S. KING, DOES THE UNITED KINGDOM STILL HAVE A
CONSTITUTION? 3 (Sweet & Maxwell 2001).
314
STÉPHANE P. DEMRI & EWA S. ORLOWSKA, INCOMPLETE INFORMATION:
STRUCTURE, INFERENCE, COMPLEXITY 15 (Springer 2002) (indicating that “[a]
concept is determined by its extension (or denotation) and intension (or
connotation). The extension of a concept consists of the objects that are instances
of this concept and the intension of a concept consists of the properties that are
characteristic for the objects to which this concept applies”).
315
KING, supra note 313, at 3.
313
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Parliamentary privilege will not therefore be respected when its
exercise “is in clear contravention to the Constitution,”316 even if the
main text of the constitution is silent.317 The Justices ruled:
Under the principle of popular sovereignty (Article 2
of the Constitution), the communication processes in
which public opinion is freely expressed and the will
of the people is freely formed are the safeguard of
popular sovereignty. In other words, the exercise of
popular sovereignty, when expressed in a
constitutional system and its operation, requires
openness and transparency, which enable democratic
deliberation through rational communication and thus
lay the foundation for the legitimacy of a
constitutional state. Considering that constitutional
amendment is the direct embodiment of popular
sovereignty, the fact that the National Assembly never
used a secret ballot in the previous nine rounds of
constitutional amendments, including during the
enactment and amendment of the Temporary
Provisions and the Additional Articles, speaks to the
principle of popular sovereignty. When the Delegates
and their political parties are accountable to their
constituents through such open and transparent
amendment process, the constituents are able to hold
them accountable through recall or re-election. Thus,
the provision for the secret ballot in Article 38,
Paragraph 2 of the Rules of the National Assembly
shall not be applied to voting on any constitutional
amendment. Not only must the readings for the
adoption of a constitutional amendment comply with
the Constitution strictly, but their procedures also
need to conform to the constitutional order of liberal
democracy (see J.Y. Interpretation No. 381).318

316

SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130 (Official translation).
E.g., SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130; SHIZI NO. 381 JIESHI , supra note
243; SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI, supra note 97; and SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2.
318
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 5 (Official translation).
317
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In the eyes of the Justices, “openness and transparency”319
were “the foundation for the legitimacy of a constitutional state,”320
because the Constitution 321 “explicitly provides that political
representatives at all levels are recallable.” 322 “[T]he National
Assembly, on behalf of the people, is the sole constitutional organ
that has the power to amend the Constitution,” 323 and its
constitutional amending power does not “require the approval of a
bicameral parliament or the ratification of a parliamentary-adopted
constitutional amendment bill by either a national referendum or state
legislatures.” 324 In other words, if a secret ballot is deemed
constitutional in the event of constitutional amendment under such a
framework, popular sovereignty 325 would become a dead letter. 326
Hence, the Justices ruled that “the use of a secret ballot is a manifest
and gross [flaw].”327 Even though the main text of the Constitution
is silent, the use of a secret ballot “is in clear contravention to the
Constitution.”328
However, there was a variety of different opinions amongst
the Justices. Justice Lin Young-Mou argued that the Justices might
deliver a wrong message via the use of secret ballot, and that judicial
interference could take place only when “manifest and gross flaws”329
were found in constitutional amendments.330 He suggested a stricter
and broader review. 331 Justice Lai In-Jaw argued that recalling
Judicial Yuan’s previous decisions332 should not in itself lead to the
conclusion that “the use of a secret ballot is a manifest and gross

319

Id.
Id.
321
MINGUO XIANFA § 133 (1947) (Taiwan); see also SHIZI NO. 401 JIESHI (釋字
第 401 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 401] (1996).
322
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 8 (Official translation).
323
Id. Reasoning ¶ 5 (Official translation).
324
Id.
325
MINGUO XIANFA § 2 (1947) (Taiwan).
326
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, Reasoning ¶¶ 5–6.
327
Id. Reasoning ¶ 6 (Official translation).
328
SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130 (Official translation).
329
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 1 (Official translation).
330
Id. (Lin Y-M, partial concurring).
331
Id.
332
SHIZI NO. 342 JIESHI, supra note 130; SHIZI NO.381 JIESHI, supra note 243;
SHIZI NO. 419 JIESHI, supra note 97.
320
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[flaw],”333 and he also suggested a stricter and broader review.334 On
the other hand, Justice Sun Sen-Yen argued against the idea that the
use of a secret ballot is unconstitutional, citing the fact that the main
text of the Constitution was silent in the subject.335 He argued that
Dennis T.C. Tang as counsel admitted that “it is hard to say whether
the use of a secret ballot in the event of constitutional amendment
should be banned by the Constitution.”336 Tang’s acknowledgement
was shared by Justices Su Jyun-Hsiung 337 and Chen Chi-Nan, 338
despite the fact that Su upheld the principle of “openness and
transparency”339 unquestionably.340

XII.

CONCLUSION

Both authors of this article were witnesses to the Fifth
Amendment of the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the
Republic of China341 and the following Judicial Yuan Interpretation
No. 499 [2000], although one of the authors was only a law school
student at the time, whose law school was located next to the chamber
of the National Assembly. As Dennis T.C. Tang and Su Yeong-Chin
outlined in their instruments of appeal342 respectively, both authors
witnessed the anger of the public (Tang: Min-Yuan; Su: Min-ZhongFan-Dui343 ) towards the National Assembly’s self-extension of its
term of office.344 Of course the National Assembly did more than
this, but it was this that really angered the Taiwanese citizens345 the
most in political terms.

333

SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2, at Reasoning ¶ 6 (2000) (Official
translation).
334
Id. (Lai I-J, concurring).
335
Id. (Sun S-Y, partial concurring).
336
Id. (Authors’ translation).
337
Id. (Su J-H, concurring).
338
Id. (Chen C-N, concurring and partial dissenting).
339
Id. Reasoning ¶ 5 (Official translation).
340
Id. (Su J-H, concurring).
341
MINGUO XIANFA amend. (民國憲法增修條文) [Additional Articles of the
Constitution of the Republic of China] (1999) (Taiwan).
342
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
343
Id.
344
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan).
345
JUDICIAL YUAN INTERPRETATION, supra note 5.
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Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 [2000] was not a single
incident in politics. Instead it represented the final instalment of the
tetralogy of anti-lifelong tenure in Taiwan. 346 Although it also
involved in the scope of judicial review (versus parliamentary
privilege) and restraints on the constitutional amending power,347 the
extension of the term of office 348 was always the main factor. 349
Consequently, no jurist involved—apart from Justice Tseng Hua Sun,
who submitted the only dissenting opinion350—expressed agreement
about extending the term of office in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.
499 [2000] despite disagreeing with each other regarding the
application of due process. 351 The Chinese political tradition of
lifelong tenure352 was (and remains) a political taboo in Taiwan, and
no one has the power to extend any term of office for any reason in
346

Compare SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI (釋字第 31 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 31] (1954), with SHIZI NO. 150 JIESHI (釋字第 150 號解釋)
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 150] (1977), SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第 261
號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261] (1990), and SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (
釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000).
347
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2.
348
MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 1 (1999) (Taiwan); MINGUO XIANFA amend. § 4
(1999) (Taiwan).
349
JEAN-PIERRE CABESTAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN AND
DEMOCRATISATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A MODEL OR A PRECEDENT FOR
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA?, in TAIWAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ASPECTS
AND LIMITATIONS OF A DEVELOPMENT MODEL 221 (Robert Ash & J. Megan
Greene eds., Routledge 2007) (indicating that “the extension of the term of the
National Assembly was initiated by a DPP deputy (Law I-tieg), this version
provoked immediate condemnation by most political leaders and the majority of
the public”).
350
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI, supra note 2 (Tseng H-S, dissenting).
351
Compare SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499] (2000), with SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋)
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Lin Y-M & Sun S-Y, partial
concurring), SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Su J-H & Lai I-J, concurring), SHIZI NO. 499
JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Chen
C-N, concurring and partial dissenting), SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第 499 號解釋
) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000) (Tseng H-S, dissenting), and
SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI YIJIANSHU CHAOBENDENG WENJIAN (釋字第 499 號解釋意
見書抄本等文件) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499 Appendix] (2000).
352
LIU, supra note 23, at 58 (indicating that the Chinese “traditional rule [was]
lifetime tenure for the ruler”).
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future, unless the country finds itself in a state of emergency once
more.353

353

Compare SHIZI NO. 31 JIESHI (釋字第 31 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan
Interpretation No. 31] (1954), with SHIZI NO. 261 JIESHI (釋字第 261 號解釋)
[Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261] (1990), and SHIZI NO. 499 JIESHI (釋字第
499 號解釋) [Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 499] (2000).
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